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This Rejoinder will leave aside (albeit with thanks) the articles that explain the background to, the context
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The word "rejoinder" connotes a reply to criticism,' and that connotation sets
the scope of this short essay. This Rejoinder will leave aside (albeit with
thanks) the articles that explain the background to, the context for, or particular
aspects of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act (2001) (the new Act/ULPA
(2001)). Instead, this Rejoinder will focus on the three articles that purport to
find a blemish (Professor Bishop), a general theoretical deficiency (Mr.
Callison and Dean Vestal), or a fundamental misconception (Professor
Ribstein) in the new Act.
ProfessorBishop and the "Control Rule " Blemish
2

In his article, The New Limited Partner Liability Shield, Professor Carter
Bishop begins with a very useful history of the control rule, which ULPA
(2001) has eliminated. 3 He then suggests two sets of circumstances in which,
despite the elimination of the control rule, a limited partner might face generalpartner-like liability for the debts of a limited partnership. 4 With all respect to
my co-author,5 co-reporter, 6 and friend,7 this proposition is far more interesting

as a concept than substantial as a practical danger.
According to Professor Bishop, the limited partner's danger has two aspects.

t The author served as the Reporter for the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws (NCCSUL) Drafting Committee on the Limited Partnership Act.
1. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1291 (7th ed. 1999) (defining the term as "[t]he defendant's answer to
the plaintiff's reply").
2. Carter G. Bishop, The New Limited Partner Liability Shield: Has the Vanquished Control Rule
Unwittingly Resurrected Lingering Limited Partner Estoppel Liability as Well as Full General Partner
Liability?, 37 SUFFOLK UNIV. L. REv. 667 (2004).
3. Daniel S. Kleinberger, A User's Guide to the New Uniform Limited Partnership Act, 37 SUFFOLK
UNIV. L. REv. 583, 625-31 (2004).
4. See generally Bishop, supranote 2.
5. See, e.g., CARTER G. BISHOP & DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES: TAX AND
BUSINESS LAW (Warren Gorham & Lamont/RIA 1994 & Supp. 2003-2).
6. The author and Professor Bishop serve as Co-Reporters for the NCCUSL Drafting Committee on the
proposed "second generation" Uniform Limited Liability Company Act. See National Conference on
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws Drafting Committee, Uniform Limited Liability Company Act,
http://www.llcproject.org (last visited Apr. 17, 2004).
7. This proposition is beyond citation, but some words from Emerson are on point: "A friend is a person
with whom I may be sincere. Before him, I may think aloud." RALPH WALDO EMERSON Friendship, in
ESSAYS: FIRST SERIES (1841).
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The first is that a limited partner's "participation in management and control"
might cause the limited partner to be "deemed" a general partner and thereby8
subject to general partner liability for all the debts of the limited partnership.
In Professor Bishop's view, this danger has two sources in the new Act. First,
the new Act blurs the line between general and limited partners by permitting a
person to become a general partner without being so designated in the limited
partnership's certificate of limited partnership 9 and without having the written
consent of the partners. Second, by eliminating the control rule, the new Act
encourages or at least enables limited partners to participate so fulsomely in the
management of the limited partnership as to appear to be general partners de
facto through the partners' implied consent.1 0
As Gene Wilder's character exclaims in the movie, YOUNG FRANKENSTEIN,
"It could work!" However, there are several substantial practical barriers.
First, although the new Act permits limited partners to substantially participate
in management without risking their liability shield, few limited partnerships
will have that type of power-sharing structure. For such arrangements, a
limited liability company is a far more likely vehicle; the new Act is designed
for "sophisticated, manager-entrenchedcommercial deals"' 1 or family limited
partnerships in which general partner control is a principal raisond'etre.12
Second, where a limited partner does substantially participate in
management, that participation will almost always be the product of negotiation
between the general and limited partner, which will be documented in a
partnership agreement that expressly characterizes the limited partner as a
limited partner. That agreement will expressly and formally negate any
creditor argument that the limited partner's participation reflects the limited
partner's implicit and informal admission into the status of general partner.
Third, even in the most minimally-lawyered limited partnership deals, the
partnership agreement will state that admission of a general partner requires
some form of written consent or vote. This formal requirement should by itself
suffice to negate a de facto general partner theory advanced by a limited
partnership creditor.
Fourth, although under the new Act a person can become a general partner
without the certificate of limited partnership so stating,' 3 the new Act requires
the prompt amendment of the certificate to indicate the admission of a new
general partner. Both the general partners and the limited partnership are at

8. See Bishop, supra note 2, at 708.
9. For a detailed analysis of this feature of the new Act, see Kleinberger, in note 3 above, at 653-57.
10. Bishop, supra note 2, at 707-10.
11. UNIF. LTD. P'SHIP ACT Prefatory Note (The Act's Overall Approach) (emphasis added) [hereinafter
ULPA (2001)].
12. See Thomas Earl Geu, Selected Estate Planning Aspects of the Uniform Limited PartnershipAct
(2001), 37 SUFFOLK UNIV. L. REv. 735, 736 (2004).
13. Kleinberger, supra note 3, at 653-57.
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risk for failing to do so.14 Consequently, failure to amend is strong evidence
against an implied admission theory.
Fifth, as Professor Bishop points out, a well-advised limited partnership will
be a limited liability limited partnership (LLLP), 15 and, with a LLLP, not even
general partners have status-based liability for the limited partnership's debts.16
The second aspect of Professor Bishop's concern is estoppel liability.' 7 The
nub of this theory is that: (i) a limited partner's participation in the
management and control of a limited partnership might cause an innocent third
party to reasonably believe that the limited partner is a general partner and
thereby liable for the limited partnership's debts; (ii) those beliefs might cause
the third party to deal with the limited partnership (reliance); and (iii) if so, the
limited partner should be estopped from denying general-partner-like liability
for the limited partnership's debt to the third party.
Estoppel is necessarily conduct-based, and the new Act certainly leaves open
the possibility of an estoppel claim. The limited partner's liability shield
pertains to obligations asserted "solely by reason of [the asserted obligor] being
a limited partner"' 18 and "does not prevent a limited partner from being liable as
a result of the limited partner's own conduct."' 19 The shield "is therefore
inapplicable when a third party asserts
that a limited partner's own wrongful
20
conduct has injured the third party."
Nonetheless, substantial practical barriers face any third party that asserts an
estoppel claim. First, the claim presupposes that the limited partner is so
substantially involved in management as to cause a third party to believe that
the limited partner is a general partner.
As discussed above, 2 1 such
involvement will be rare.
Second, the third party's belief and reliance must be reasonable. Of course,
if a limited partner affirmatively misrepresents itself as a general partner, the
misrepresentation should be separately actionable. But Professor Bishop's
focus is on estoppel that arises from a course of dealing. How reasonable is it
for a potential obligee to assume a person is a general partner without that
person ever saying so? Moreover, how reasonable can it be to rely on an
appearance of general partner status when a simple telephone call to, or Internet
stop with, the relevant filing office will reveal that the person is not a general
partner according to the public record? A person can be a general partner
14. Kleinberger, supra note 3, at 654.
15. Bishop, supra note 2, at 710.
16. Kleinberger, supra note 3, at 619-25.
17. Bishop, supra note 2, at 711-15.

18. ULPA (2001) § 303.
19. ULPA (2001) § 303 cmt.
20. Id.;
see also ULPA (2001) § 107(a) (providing that "[u]nless displaced by particular provisions of this
[Act], the principles of law and equity supplement this [Act]"); Kleinberger, supra note 3, at 630 (explaining
how the limited partner liability shield does not protect against conduct-based claims).
21. Supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
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without being so designated in the public
especially one about to decide to take a
If
without even checking the record?
the
appearances indicate another, shouldn't
23
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22

record, but can a third partysubstantial risk-reasonably rely
the record says one thing and
reasonable person at least inquire

further before relying on appearances?
Third, the estoppel argument depends not only on a claimant's reasonable
belief as to a limited partner's status, but also on the claimant's reasonable
belief that the apparent status carries a particular liability result. That is, it is
not enough for the estoppel claimant to prove that it reasonably believed that a
limited partner was a general partner. The claimant must also prove that it
reasonably believed that the apparent general partner would be liable for the
limited partnership's debts by reason of generalpartner status. Once upon a

time, the latter point would have proved itself; for centuries the "hallmark
consequence" of general partner status was personal liability for the obligations
of the partnership. 24 Today, however, the status of general partner no longer

carries an automatic implication of personal liability. As Professor Bishop
points out, "the limited liability partnership (LLP) is already becoming standard
fare" for the general partnership, 25 and the LLLP form is becoming increasingly
available. In general, it is an anachronism to believe that an owner-even 6 an
owner-manager-is by that status automatically liable for the entity's debts.

In sum, as a practical matter, the new Act's "[v]anquished control rule" has
not "[r]esurrected lingering limited partner estoppel liability [or] full general
partner liability" for limited partners. 27
J. William Callison, Dean Allan W. Vestal and the New Act's "Lack of a
Theory "
In contrast with Professor Bishop's more focused critique, J. William

22. See Kleinberger, supra note 3, at 653-57.
23. For a discussion of an analogous question, see ULPA (2001) comment to section 401 (following 2nd
Example). The comment (i) acknowledges that "[t]he omission of a person's name from the certificate's list of
general partners is not notice that the person is not a general partner," (ii) states that a "Third Party review of
the certificate does not mean that Third Party knew, had received a notification or had notice that [the
undesignated general partner] lacked authority" to bind the limited partnership, but (iii) notes that the limited
partnership "could argue that, because Third Party knew that [the undesignated general partner] was not listed
in the certificate, a transaction entered into by [the undesignated general partner] could not appear to Third
Party to be for apparently carrying on the limited partnership's activities in the ordinary course." Compare
ULPA (2001) § 201(d)(2) (addressing conflicts between the publicly-filed certificate of limited partnership and
the private partnership agreement and providing that, if the third party has reasonably relied to its detriment on
the certificate, as between the third party and the limited partnership "the certificate of limited partnership...
prevail[s]").
24. DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, AGENCY, PARTNERSHIP AND LLCs § 7.3, at 200 (2000).
25. Bishop, supra note 2, at 710.
26. See ULPA (2001) § 108(a) cmt. (explaining that it is no longer "reasonable for third parties to believe
that an individual whose own name appear[s] in the name of a business [will] 'stand behind' the business").
27. See Bishop, supra note 2, at 667.
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Callison and Dean Allan Vestal take issue generally with the new Act for what
they see as its lack of "a clearly articulated theory when structuring information
access and disclosure provisions, and correlative fiduciary duties."" Their
critique is consistent with their previously stated criticisms of the Revised
Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA) and the Uniform Limited Liability Company
Act (ULLCA) 29 and contains five major points:
1. By incorporating RUPA's fiduciary duty formulation,
ULPA (2001)
30
incorporated the manifest defects of that formulation.
2. By incorporating RUPA's statement on the relationship among good
faith, fiduciary duty, and self-interest, ULPA
(2001) joined RUPA in
31
"debas[ing] the partnership relationship.

3. Given the structural differences between the paradigmatic general
partnership and the paradigmatic limited partnership, general partners in
a limited partnership should have different fiduciary duties (or, at least,
a different formulation
of fiduciary duties) than general partners in a
32
general partnership.
4. Given that ULPA (2001) permits and, arguably, even encourages the
allocation of significant power to limited partners, the statutory
allocation of fiduciary duty should, in effect, "float" to follow any such
33
allocation.
5. Limited partners should have a fiduciary duty not to
misuse confidential
34
information obtained from the limited partnership.
This Rejoinder will address each of these points in turn and then consider the
new Act's supposed "want of a theory."
Incorporting the "defects" of RUPA's fiduciary duty formulation: The

Symposium's "User's Guide" addresses this issue in depth.35 Here it is worth
adding that RUPA was approved by the American Bar Association and has
already been adopted by a substantial majority of the states.36 Some adopting

28. J. William Callison & Allan W. Vestal, The Want of a Theory, Again, 37 SUFFOLK UNIV. L. REv. 719,
719 (2004).
29. See, e.g., id. at 719 & n.2, 720 & nn.3-6, 722 & n.12, 727 & nn.33, 35-38 & 40, 728 & n.41, 729 &
n.43, 730 & n.50.
30. Id. at 727.
31. Id. at 727.
32. Callison & Vestal, supra note 28, at 728-29.
33. Callison & Vestal, supra note 28, at 721. The word "float" is the author's, not Mr. Callison's and
Dean Vestal's.
34. Callison & Vestal, supra note 28, at 732.
35. Kleinberger, supranote 3, at 631-34.
36. Information provided on the NCCUSL website: A Few Facts about the Uniform Partnership Act
(1994)(1997), http://nceusl.org/nccusl/uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-upa9497.asp (last visited Apr. 17,
2004). The America Bar Association also approved ULPA (2001), see A Few Factsabout the Uniform Limited
Partnership Act (2001), http://nccusl.org/nccusl/uniformact-factsheets/uniformacts-fs-ulpa.asp (last visited
Apr. 10, 2004).
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states have varied the fiduciary duty formulation, and those states can and
7
probably will make corresponding changes when adopting ULPA (200 1).
Fellow-traveling with RUPA's debasement of good faith and fiduciary
duty-Like RUPA, ULPA (2001) provides that: "A... partner does not violate
a duty or obligation under this [Act] or under the partnership agreement merely

because the... partner's conduct furthers the... partner's own interest." 38 Mr.
Callison and Dean Vestal believe that "this endorsement of self-interest debases
the partnership relationship. 39
This condemnation reflects a too-narrow understanding of the partnership
relationship. When a partner deals with the partnership, fiduciary duty applies
in full force. However, when a partner deals with a fellow partner, undivided
loyalty is neither possible nor required:
According to Cardozo, partners may not use tactics appropriate to "arm's
length" transactions in their inter se dealings. But even if partners are never
fully at arm's length, they are nonetheless occasionally on opposite sides of the
negotiating table.
In such circumstances,
self-interest is inherent and
40
inevitable. It therefore cannot be perse evil.

For an example of this reality, consider the partners in a law firm who,
pursuant to a partnership agreement, decide annually how to share out a certain
"bonus" portion of the firm's profits. In this "zero sum game," some selfinterest is inevitably in play.
Like RUPA, ULPA (2001) accepts this reality. "The obligation of good
faith and fair dealing is not a fiduciary duty, does not command altruism or
self-abnegation, and does not prevent a partner from acting in the partner's own
self-interest. ' '4 1 Nonetheless, as explained in detail in the "User's Guide," the
concept of good faith and fair dealing remains an effective (albeit narrow)
42
means to police partner-to-partner conduct under the new Act.

37. For example, Illinois's version of RUPA varies from the uniform act's approach by making the
formulation of fiduciary duties non-exclusive. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 206/404(a) (2004). The bill to enact
ULPA (2001) in Illinois makes the same change. See S.B. 2982 (as engrossed), § 408 (page 40, lines 6-10),
93rd Gen. Assem. (Il. 2004), available at http://www.legis.state.il.us/legislation/93/sb/09300sb29821v.htm
(last visited Apr. 16, 2004). As of April 8, 2004, the bill had passed the Senate by a vote of 55-0 and received a
first reading in the House. See State of Illinois, 93rd General Assembly, Senate Vote, Senate Bill 2982 (Mar.
26, 2004), availableat http://www.legis.state.il.us/legislation/votehistory/93/senate/09300SB2982-03262004012000T.pdf; Illinois General Assembly, Bill Status of SB2982, 93rd General Assembly (House action),
available at http://www.legis.state.il.us/legislation/BillStatus.asp?DocNum=2982&GAID=3&DocTypeID=
SB&LegID= 10154&SessionlD=3&GA--93#actions (last visited Apr. 16, 2004).
38. ULPA (2001) § 305(c) (referring to limited partners); § 408(e) (referring to general partners). The
RUPA provision is section 404(e), which is identical to the new Act's formulation, except that the RUPA
provision refers simply to a "partner."
39. Callison & Vestal, supra note 28, at 727.
40. KLEINBERGER, supra note 24, § 9.8.5, at 265.
41. ULPA (2001) § 305(b) cmt.; see also ULPA (2001) § 408(d) cmt. ("This provision [on the obligation
of good faith and fair dealing] is identical to Section 305(b) and the Comment to Section 305(b) is applicable
here.").
42. For further discussion of good faith under the new Act, see Kleinberger, note 4 above, at 635-38.
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Differentfiduciary duty formulationsfor two categoricallydifferent types of
partnerships? Mr. Callison and Dean Vestal assert that, because general and
limited partnerships involve fundamentally different types of power
arrangements, the limited partnership statute should not have the same
formulation for general partner fiduciary duty as the general partnership statute:
[G]eneral partner fiduciary duties should be more robust in limited partnerships
than they are in general partnerships where, at least as a default rule, all general
partners participate in firm management. Partnership law has long recognized
that partners
with controlling power should be subject to heightened fiduciary
43
duties.

The Reporter for the new Act had some sympathy with this point of view
and urged it during the drafting process. However, wiser heads prevailed, a in
part because no one could identify a set of circumstances in which the RUPA
45
formulation would produce a bad result in the limited partnership context.
The notion that the RUPA formulation "reduc[es] the general partners'
fiduciary responsibilities" 6 had no traction within the drafting committee-not
among the NCCUSL Commissioners (who had voting rights) and not among
the ABA Advisors (whose collective judgment was often at least as powerful as
47
the Commissioners' voting rights). And, as explained in the "User's Guide,"

43. Callison & Vestal, supra note 28, at 729.
44. But see ULLCA (2001) comment to section 107(a), which asks "to what extent is the case law of
general partnerships relevant to limited partnerships governed by this Act?" and notes that the new Act does not
address the question. The Comment then suggests the following approach:
Predecessor law, RULPA Section 403, expressly equated the rights, powers, restrictions, and
liabilities of a general partner in a limited partnership with the rights, powers, restrictions, and
liabilities of a partner in a general partnership. This Act has no comparable provision....
Therefore, a court should not assume that a case concerning a general partnership is automatically
relevant to a limited partnership governed by this Act. A general partnership case may be relevant
by analogy, especially if (1) the issue in dispute involves a provision of this Act for which a
comparable provision exists under the law of general partnerships; and (2) the fundamental
differences between a general partnership and limited partnership are immaterial to the disputed

issue.
45. Mr. Callison and Dean Vestal believe that they have found such circumstances: "the need to
recognize that there can be preformation duties is probably heightened in traditional limited partnerships in
which general partners are active, and limited partners passive, with respect to preformation negotiations and
business arrangements." Callison & Vestal, supra note 28, at 728. In the Reporter's view, this point has some
substance, but the drafting committee did not agree. Moreover, the anecdotal information provided by the
ABA Advisers suggested that limited partnership deals are often heavily lawyered on both sides. This
information suggests that the need for pre-formation duties may sometimes be less in the limited partnership
context than with some general partnerships, where the absence of lawyers for any participants may lead to
unrecognized instances of overreaching. See also Callison & Vestal, supra note 28, at 730 (describing
circumstances in which the limited partner is more powerful and sophisticated than the general partner).
46. Callison & Vestal, supranote 28, at 729.
47. Kleinberger, supra note 3, at 635-38.
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the statutory duty of good
faith and fair dealing is available to control any
48
expropriating behavior.
Should the allocationoffiduciary duty 'float" between generalpartners and

limited partners? In its allocation of fiduciary duty, ULPA (2001) draws a
clear line between general partners (who have it, in their capacity as general
partners, and cannot delegate it away) and limited partners (who do not and will
not have it, in their capacity as limited partners, even if the limited partnership
agreement allocates to them management rights beyond those provided by the
statute). 49 Mr. Callison and Dean Vestal criticize this approach and assert that
"the actual relations of the partners, and not the formal designation, should
control" the allocation of fiduciary duties and that the allocation
should be
50
responsive to "the amount of actual control in given situations."
As detailed in "A User's Guide," 51 early drafts of the new Act considered a
"pro tanto" approach, but the Drafting Committee rejected the idea for at least
five reasons:
1. Given the Act's "strong manager" construct, a general partner's
fiduciary duties should be nondelegable. It would be improper to allow
a pro tanto provision to "strip away" a general partner's fiduciary duty.
2. Fiduciary duty properly attaches to managers, given their ongoing
control of an enterprise's operations, and should not automatically
extend to mere owners who might be able to bargain for an increased
role in governance (and thereby some increased control over the general
partners).
3. Any pro tanto provision would inevitably create difficult line-drawing
issues. Suppose, for example, a partnership agreement required the
general partners to prepare and submit an annual operating budget to the
limited partners. Consider how difficult it would be to divide the
budgetary duty of care between the general and limited partners.
4. A pro tanto provision would necessarily be under-inclusive, unless the
provision were to cover not only reallocation via the partnership
agreement but also delegation by the general partner to one or more
limited partners through a separate agreement.
5. If the partnership agreement allocates substantial managerial authority
to limited partners who misuse that authority to unfairly prejudice other

48. See also BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 5, 14.05[4][a], at S14-17 (explaining that, even under
Delaware's fulsomely "contractarian" limited partnership statute, even the most far-reaching agreement "will
not immunize managers or members from claims that they have acted in bad faith and with a 'tortious state of
mind' and that "even the most aggressive exculpatory provisions will not prevent the Delaware courts from
enjoining illegitimate conduct or ordering other equitable remedies") (footnotes omitted).
49. Kleinberger, supra note 3, at 646-49.
50. Callison & Vestal, supra note 28, at 721-22.
5 1. Kleinberger, supra note 3, at 646-49.
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partners, the statutory obligation of good faith and fair dealing will
52
provide adequate recourse,
As to Mr. Callison and Dean Vestal's assertion that "in their experience" a
partnership agreement might allocate management rights to limited partners
"particularly in the event the partnership's business does not perform as
projected," 53 this is precisely the type of situation in which the limited partners
should not be burdened with fiduciary duty. During the drafting process,
several ABA Advisors emphasized this point. When a general partner is
misbehaving and the limited partners seek to enforce their rights under the
partnership agreement, the general partner should not be in a position to
threaten the limited partners with claims that
the limited partners are breaching
54
some fiduciary duty to the general partner.
Or, in the words of the Delaware Chancery Court:
A fiduciary is typically one who is entrusted with the power to manage and
control the property of another. In this case, that description would seem to fit
[the General Partner], who has almost exclusive control over the management
of the Partnership. Therefore, it is with some irony that [the General Partner]
argues that the Limited Partners have breached their fiduciary duties in
attempting to remove the General Partner who manages and controls their
property, and with whom they are no longer satisfied. In this particular case,
that action is more akin to shareholders voting to remove a 5board
of directors5
action to which fiduciary duties would not normally attach.
Should limitedpartners have a fiduciary duty not to misuse the confidential
information they obtain from the limited partnership?56 There is no question
that a limited partnership should be able to protect itself from such misuse, and
"A User's Guide" characterizes this area as one of the "rough edges" of the
new Act's approach to fiduciary duty. 57 However, as that same article explains,
the new Act provides some protection through the statutory obligation of good
faith and fair dealing and authorizes further protection via the partnership

52. As for "[h]ope springing eternal," Callison & Vestal, supra note 28, at 721, there is the current draft
of"ULLCA II," NCCUSL's project to draft a "second generation" uniform limited liability company act. The
April 2004 meeting draft distinguishes "operational responsibilities" from "governance responsibility" and
applies different fiduciary standards to the two categories. See ULLCA II § 102(7) (defining "governance
responsibility"); § 102(12) (defining "operational responsibilities"); § 408 (stating standards of conduct). The
April, 2004 meeting draft is available at http://www.law.upenn.eduibll/ulc/ ullca/Apr2004MtgDraft.htm (last
visited Apr. 16, 2004), and at http://www.llcproject.org/ULLCAiULLCA_ Apr04 MtgDraft.pdf (last visited
Apr. 16, 2004). As of this writing, the ULLCA II drafting committee has not discussed the April 2004 draft.
53. Callison & Vestal, supra note 28, at 724 n.15.
54. If the limited partners are overreaching the agreement, the general partner has ample protection under
the agreement and the statutory obligation of good faith and fair dealing. Kleinberger, supra note 3, at 635-38.
55. Wilmington Leasing, Inc v. Parrish Leasing Co., L.P., No. 15202, 1996 WL 752364, at *14 n.19 (Del.
Ch. Dec. 23, 1996).
56. Callison & Vestal, supra note 28, at 732.
57. Kleinberger, supra note 3, at 642.
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agreement. 58 The new Act even authorizes
the general partners to act on their
59
protection.
further
still
achieve
to
own
Want of a theory? As to Mr. Callison and Dean Vestal's general complaint
that the new Act is bereft of an animating theory, the answer is that the Act's
provisions reflect a confluence of two theories:
" first, given "a world in which limited liability partnerships and limited
liability companies can meet many of the needs formerly met by limited
partnerships, ' 6° the new Act should seek to serve "two types of
61
enterprises that seem largely beyond the scope of LLPs and LLCs,"
namely:
- "sophisticated, manager-entrenched commercial deals whose
participants commit for the long term, and.., estate planning
arrangements (family limited partnerships), 62 which means in turn
that,
- "the Act's rules, and particularly its default rules" should assume
"strong centralized management, strongly entrenched," and
"passive63 investors with little control over or right to exit the
entity,"

"

second, given the almost dizzying pace of change in business entity
statutes 64 and despite the formal de-linking of the new Act from
RUPA, 65 the new Act should be drafted so that it can be learned and
understood in tandem with RUPA.
At first glance, the second "theory" may seem a mere matter of convenience
and not a theory at all. But the "in tandem" approach can significantly reduce
learning costs for the non-expert and perhaps make life a bit more bearable for
the business law practitioner trying to keep pace with the rapidly evolving law
of business entities.
ProfessorRibstein andNCCUSL 's "Heavy-Handed"Approach to Fiduciary
Duty Waivers

In contrast to Mr. Callison and Dean Vestal, Professor Ribstein believes that
the new Act's fiduciary duties are too "robust," at least in the sense that they
are too resistant to waiver by contract. In his article, Fiduciary Duties and

58. Kleinberger, supranote 3, at 642.
59. Kleinberger, supra note 3, at 642.
60. ULPA (2001) Prefatory Note (The Act's Overall Approach).

61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Kleinberger, supranote 3, at 583-84.
65. ULPA (2001) Prefatory Note (The Decision to "De-Link" and Create a Stand Alone Act). For a

detailed discussion of this decision, see Kleinberger, in note 3 above, at 584-87.
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Limited PartnershipAgreements, Professor Ribstein seeks to show "that the

ULPA 2001's restrictions on contracting regarding fiduciary duties are
seriously misguided because they are based on a fundamental misunderstanding
66
of the special nature and functions of the limited partnership form."
ULPA (2001) does limit the extent to which a limited partnership agreement
can affect both fiduciary duties and the obligation of good faith and fair
dealing, 67 and Professor Ribstein's critique fits well within his well-known and
oft-rehearsed approach to fiduciary duty and business entities. 68 To him, and to
other "contractarian" scholars, fiduciary duties within a business organization
are merely a subset of the default rules that the law provides to govern the
owners' inter se relationship. 69 At least as to inter se matters, any "particular
business form" is "a default contract," and fiduciary duties are mere gapfillers 7 0 -to be restricted or even eliminated as the parties see fit.
In Professor Ribstein's view, the driving force behind business entity
structure should be the market for efficient sets of default rules. 71 For any72
particular business form, Cardozo's "punctilio of an honor the most sensitive"
is appropriate (or not) depending on whether the punctilio serves the goal of
efficiency.
Professor Ribstein's critique of ULPA (2001) has three main components:
(1) RUPA's restrictions on fiduciary duty waivers are grievously mistaken, and
ULPA (2001) has replicated that grievous mistake; (2) even if RUPA-like
limitations on waiver make sense for general partnerships, such limitations
make no sense for the very different world of limited partnerships; and (3) the
Delaware law of limited partnerships has developed a near perfect approach to
fiduciary duty waivers in limited partnerships, and ULPA (2001) has turned its
back on Delaware's wisdom. Each component will be addressed in turn.
Replicating RUPA's "mistake" on fiduciary duty waiver?-Professor

Ribstein devotes a substantial portion of his article to demonstrating the fallacy
of RUPA's approach to waiver of fiduciary duties, 73 while noting that "RUPA
has now been adopted in approximately half the states., 74 If RUPA is wrong
66. Larry E. Ribstein, FiduciaryDuties and Limited PartnershipAgreements, 37 SUFFOLK UNIV. L. REv.

927, 927 (2004).
67. Kleinberger, supra note 3, at 632.
68. See e.g., Ribstein, supra note 66, at 931 n.9, 933 n.21, 937 n.41, 940 n.52, 941 n.59, 945 n.77, 951
n.94.
69. Ribstein, supra note 66, at 934 (stating that "[tihe appropriate design of limited partnership fiduciary
duties" should be developed just "like that of other standard form rules"); id at 937 (stating that "[f]iduciary
duties are a specific type of contractual term").
70. Ribstein, supra note 66, at 931.

71.

Ribstein, supra note 66, at 934.

72. The phrase is from Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928), and is "probably the most often
quoted passage in all of partnership law." KLEINBERGER, supra note 24, § 9.8.1, at 259.
73. Ribstein, supra note 66, at 945-51.

74. Ribstein, supra note 66, at 929.
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on the waiver point, a fortiori ULPA (2001) is wrong, because (i) the
paradigmatic limited partnership involves participants with greater
75
sophistication than the participants in the paradigmatic general partnership,
and (ii) the availability of waiver should correlate
positively with the
76
sophistication of the parties agreeing to the waiver.
But according to the marketplace of ideas, RUPA is not wrong. As of this
writing, RUPA has been adopted in thirty-two states, the District of Columbia
and the U.S. Virgin Islands. 77 Additional enactments are likely, as NCCUSL
resumes focus on RUPA following the Conference's lengthy preoccupation
with revising the Uniform Commercial Code. Moreover, while the academics
were divided on this issue,78 the American Bar Association chose to endorse
RUPA. 7 9 That endorsement should be significant to Professor Ribstein because
lawyers constitute the key decision makers in "the market for business
80
forms."
Are RUPA-like waiver limitations out of place in the world of limited
partnerships?-Analysisof this point requires an understanding of the world of
limited partnerships. Everyone agrees that the limited partnership world differs
fundamentally from the world of general partnerships, but there is considerable
disagreement as to the precise nature of the limited partnership world.81
The new Act presupposes a limited partnership world populated with passive
investors and strong, entrenched managers. 82 Professor Ribstein considers that
presupposition overbroad. He asserts that the limited partnership form should
be designed more specifically for passive investors relying on asset managersas distinguished from managers operating a "going concern" business. 83 This
hypothesis is connected to another, more salient one-namely, that the law's
approach to fiduciary duty waivers should be different (and more deferential)
in
84
the limited partnership context than in the context of other business entities.

75. On this point at least, Professor Ribstein and the drafters of ULPA (2001) agree. See ULPA (2001)
Prefatory Note (The Act's Overall Approach); Ribstein, supra note 66, at 927 (abstract).
76. Ribstein, supra note 66, at 927 (abstract).
77. Information provided on the NCCUSL website. See supranote 36.
78. See, e.g., Ribstein, supra note 66, at 941 n.53.
79. See supra note 36 (setting forth NCCUSL website).
80. Ribstein, supra note 66, at 931.
81. Compare, for example, Professor Ribstein's view, described above, that limited partners should be
assumed to be unremittingly passive, with the view of J. William Callison and Dean Vestal. See Callison &
Vestal, supra note 28, at 723 n. 15 (asserting that, "in our experience limited partnerships also are used for
transactions in which the limited partner retains substantial management participation rights").
82. ULPA (2001) Prefatory Note (The Act's Overall Approach).
83. Ribstein, supra note 66, at 934.
84. Ribstein, supra note 66, at 927 (abstract) (stating that "[elven if restrictions on fiduciary duty waivers
are appropriate in some contexts, they clearly are inappropriate in limited partnerships"); see also id. at 943
(stating that "particularly in limited partnerships, restricting wavier of fiduciary duties involves uncertain
benefits and potentially significant costs") (emphasis added).
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These hypotheses rest on some interesting assumptions, such as the notion
that the lack of a significant secondary market in limited partnership interests
"focuses more investor attention on the specific language of the constitutive
documents" 85 and the assertion that, because limited partnership interests "are
likely to be securities, the disclosure requirements of federal and state securities
of important contract provisions, including
law will "help ensure disclosure
86
fiduciary duty waivers."

Some of Professor Ribstein's assumptions are indubitably correct, but some
of the inferences are questionable. For example, limited partnership interests
are almost invariably securities, 87 but so too are interests in closely held
corporations. 88 Thus, the application of securities law to limited partnership
interests does not justify any special deference
to fiduciary duty waivers
89
agreements.
partnership
limited
in
contained
Some of Professor Ribstein's other assumptions seem questionable in
themselves. For example, the assertion that "the typical limited partnership...
is unlikely to have significant debts to outside creditors" 90 ignores real estate

limited partnerships as well as the significant tax advantages provided by nonrecourse debt. 91

In sum, his argument that the waiver regime for limited partnerships must
general partnerships remains just that-an interesting
differ from the regime for
92
argument.
unproven
but
Shunning the wisdom of Delaware-ProfessorRibstein also criticizes ULPA

(2001) for eschewing the balanced and nuanced approach to fiduciary waiver
contained in the Delaware limited partnership statute and Delaware case law:

85. Ribstein, supra note 66, at 935.
86. Ribstein, supra note 66, at 935.
87. BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 5, 11.03[1][c][ii], at 11-22, S 11-19.
88. BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 5, 11.02[7], at 11-15.
89. Professor Ribstein attempts to create a distinction by arguing that "the limited partnership form itself
serves as a caution flag that should induce users to get legal advice, and that reduces the justification for
protecting those who do not do so" and by characterizing close corporations along with general partnerships
and limited liability companies as 'default' business forms that are likely to be used by small businesses, often
with minimal planning and possibly without sophisticated legal advice." Ribstein, supra note 66, at 942. It is
difficult to see how close corporations and limited liability companies are properly characterized as "default"
forms, since both of these entities come into existence only upon the filing of a public document with a public
official or office specified by statute. Moreover, although some close corporations and LLCs come into
existence without legal advice, many are as heavily lawyered as a limited partnership deal.
90. Ribstein, supra note 66, at 935.
91. BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 5, 3.10[4], at 3-45.
92. In at least one respect, the argument is more than unproven; it is wrong. By way of denigrating the
new Act's restrictions on fiduciary waiver, Professor Ribstein asserts that "the restrictions would force general
partners in family limited partnerships to assume fiduciary duties to junior family members." Ribstein, supra
note 66, at 964. Such fiduciary duties are not problematic. To the contrary, they are essential to achieving the
tax avoidance goals of a family limited partnership. See Geu, supra note 12, at 807.
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"ULPA 2001 provides a kind of 'limited partnership law for dummies,"' 93 and
"legal advice to form under ULPA usually would be highly questionable, if not
malpractice, for the many firms
that could afford to organize under the more
94
flexible Delaware-type law."

To assess this criticism requires some assessment of the Delaware law of
limited partnerships. Without question, that law is a fertile ground for analysis.
Of late, the statute changes yearly, 95 the drafting is old style (Byzantine at
best),96 and the rich fabric of case law is achieved through often lengthy,
always expensive, and almost always complex litigation.
Moreover, even Homer nods and even the vaunted Court of Chancery
sometimes gets out line.97 For example, on the very issue of fiduciary duty
waiver, the Delaware Supreme Court recently felt compelled to engage in dicta

in order to repudiate dicta pronouncements from the Chancery Court. At least
two Chancery Court opinions had suggested that a Delaware limited
partnership agreement could completely eliminate a general partner's fiduciary

duty. The Delaware Supreme Court emphatically disagreed:
[I]n the interest of avoiding the perpetuation of a questionable statutory
interpretation that could be relied upon adversely by courts, commentators and
practitioners in the future, we are constrained to draw attention to the statutory
language and the underlying general principle in our jurisprudence that
scrupulous adherence to fiduciary duties is normally expected.... There is no
mention in [the statute], that a limited partnership9 8 agreement may eliminate the
fiduciary duties or liabilities of a general partner.

The court went on to further "note the historic cautionary approach of the
courts of Delaware that efforts by a fiduciary to escape a fiduciary duty,
whether by a corporate director or officer or other type of trustee, should be
scrutinized searchingly." 99

It thus seems a bit far-fetched to assert that the

Delaware regime of "case-by-case judicial interpretation" of fiduciary waiver is
93. Ribstein, supra note 66, at 964.
94. Ribstein, supra note 66, at 964.
95. For example, during a span of seven years the definition section alone was amended by the following
acts: 66 DEL. LAWS 316, §§ 1-3 (1987-88); 67 DEL. LAWS 348, §§ 1-2 (1989-90); 69 DEL. LAWS 258, § 1
(1993); 70 DEL. LAWS 186, § 1 (1995); 71 DEL. LAWS 78, § 1 (1997); 71 DEL. LAWS 340, §§ 1-2 (1998); 72
DEL. LAWS 228, § 1 (1999); 73 DEL. LAWS 73, §§ 1-2 (2001); 73 DEL. LAWS 297, § 1 (2001) (each amending
DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 6, § 17-101).
96. What the Delaware Supreme Court wrote in ElfAtochem North America, Inc. v. Jaffari, 727 A.2d
286, 291 (Del. 1999), of the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act could also be said of the Delaware
limited partnership statute: "provisions that are prolix, sometimes oddly organized, and do not always flow
evenly." See BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 5, 1 14.01 [2], at 14-6 to 14-7 ("Much of the Delaware LLC
Act is copied from the Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act, and, therefore, incorporates many
of that law's vagaries.") (citations omitted).
97. Horace: De Arte Poetica, 359 (Quandoque bonus dormitat Homerus) (Even the worthy Homer
sometimes nods).
98. Gotham Partners, L.P. v. Hallwood Realty Partners, L.P., 817 A.2d 160, 167-68 (Del. 2002)
(emphasis in original).
99. Id. at 168.
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so "far superior" 100 to the RUPA-ULPA approach that to invoke ULPA (2001)
is to commit malpractice.
Conclusion
This Symposium has provided an excellent opportunity to examine the new
Uniform Limited Partnership Act, to air and respond to criticisms of some of
the new Act's important provisions, and, in doing so, to honor the memory of
Marty Lubaroff, the original ABA Advisor to the drafting project that produced
ULPA (2001). He was one of the nation's preeminent partnership lawyers,
and, more importantly, a fine and decent man.

100.

Ribstein, supra note 66, at 964.
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